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The Role of Israel in Ayman Nour's 
Liberal Vision for Egypt 
OFIR WINTER
*
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT In recent years, Ayman Nour has emerged as a prominent leader of 
the Egyptian liberal opposition. Although Israel is not at the focus of his discourse, it 
is, nevertheless, not entirely ignored. This article examines Nour's attitude toward 
Israel by analyzing his views on three inter-connected issues: (a) his views on the 
Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and normalizing relations with Israel; (b) the distinction 
between his approaches to the United States and to Israel; (c) his vision for the 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of Israeli-Egyptian 
relations. In his public activity, Nour embodies a unique case study for Israel's role in 
the overall political agenda of a liberal oppositionist in contemporary Egypt. This 
article argues that understanding Nour's motives allow us to interpret his positions 
toward Israel as part of a broader line against the Egyptian regime, and not 
necessarily as reflecting a systematic ideological doctrine. 
Introduction 
In recent years, Ayman Nour has emerged as a prominent leader of the Egyptian 
liberal opposition and as a symbol of a younger generation that yearns to promote 
democracy throughout Egypt and the Arab world. He is regarded by many in the Arab 
world and in the West as a liberal democratic alternative to Husni Mubarak's deposed 
authoritarian regime, as well as a moderate secular alternative to the Islamist 
opposition, the Muslim Brotherhood. 
 While Israel is mentioned in Ayman Nour's speeches, articles and interviews, it 
is worth noting that domestic issues, rather than foreign affairs, are the focus of his 
interests. And while the platform of his Tomorrow Party does not include a clear 
statement concerning the future of the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel, the Jewish 
state is referred to in the party's platform and in a significant number of its official 
statements. These sources are important indicators of Nour's attitude toward Israel. 
This article examines this attitude through analysis of three issues: (a) his views on 
the Israeli-Egyptian peace treaty and normalizing relations with Israel; (b) the 
distinction between his respective approaches to the United States and to Israel; (c) 
his vision for the resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the future of Israeli-
Egyptian peace relations. 
Analyzing Nour's attitude toward Israel is important for several reasons. First, as 
a prominent Egyptian oppositionist with aspirations to power, it is interesting to 
examine what kind of alternative, if any, Nour offers concerning the Israeli issue. 
                                                           
* 
Ofir Winter is a Ph.D. candidate in the School of Historical Studies, History of the Middle East and 
Africa, Tel Aviv University (ofir.winter@gmail.com). He thanks Dr. Uriya Shavit for his most 
valuable suggestions and Mr. Michael Ritov for his indispensable assistance. 
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Second, in his intensive public activity over the past years, Nour embodies a unique 
case study for Israel's role in the overall political agenda of a liberal oppositionist in 
contemporary Egypt. Third, Nour's case may shed some light on the possible 
implications concerning the Egyptian peace treaty with Israel of a hypothetical 
scenario in which a liberal leader of his kind will come to power. 
Biographical Background 
Nour was born in 1964 in Mansurah. His father was a lawyer and a member of the 
Egyptian Parliament and his mother established and supervised a number of charity 
projects in his hometown. During the 1980s, after graduating from the Faculty of Law 
at Mansurah University, he started his career as a lawyer and a journalist in the 
opposition newspaper al-Wafd. In 1992, Nour wrote a book entitled al-Libaraliyya 
hiya al-Hall (“Liberalism is the Solution”, a paraphrase of the famous Islamic slogan 
“Islam is the solution”). In 1995, Nour earned his Ph.D. in the History of Law in 
Russia. That year, he was elected to the Egyptian People's Assembly, where he served 
for two terms between 1995 and 2005.
1
 Until 2001 he represented the liberal party al-
Wafd, but following disagreements with the party's chairman, Naʿman Jumʿa, in 2003 
he established “The Tomorrow Party” (Hizb al-Ghad), Egypt's first new opposition 
party in more than half a century. The party was not formally recognized by the 
Egyptian government until 27 October 2004; Nour was elected chairman at the first 
party convention held immediately afterwards.
2
 The party promotes a bold public 
agenda, addressing issues such as human rights, freedom of speech, reform of the 
legal code, free elections for the presidency and restrictions on presidential power, as 
well as domestic policies on issues such as job creation, social welfare programs and 
education. 
 In July 2005, Nour announced his candidacy for the Egyptian presidential 
election, scheduled for September 2005. In the election, Nour came second to 
Mubarak, receiving 7% of the total vote (approximately 540,000 votes), although 
foreign political observers claim he received as much as 13% of the vote.
3
 Earlier that 
year, his candidacy had been jeopardized by his 30 January arrest for allegedly 
falsifying signatures on his party‟s registration papers. Nour was released six weeks 
later, only after the American Secretary of State, Condoleezza Rice, expressed 
concern regarding his arrest and cancelled her planned visit to Cairo in protest.
4
 
Following the elections, in December 2005, Nour found himself again entangled in 
the Egyptian court system, presumably because the regime feared his growing 
oppositional power. He was sentenced to five years in prison on forgery charges. Due 
to health problems, Nour was released in February 2009. One month later, he 
announced his intention to run in the next presidential election, originally scheduled 
                                                           
1 Ayman Nour, „Ayman Nour Biography‟, http://aymanoormasr.blogspot.com/2009/12/my-
biography.html (accessed 9 December 2009). 
2 Suzanne Gershowitz, „Dissident Watch: Ayman Nour‟, Middle East Quarterly, Vol. XII: No. 3 
(summer 2005), p. 96.   
3 Jeremy M. Sharp, „Egypt: 2005 Presidential and Parliamentary Elections‟, CRS Report for Congress, 
http://digital.library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs/data/2006/upl-meta-crs-10216/RS22274_2006Jan15.pdf, 
(accessed 15 January 2006); Alon Levin and Yuval Bustan, „Sheat Mivhan LeMubarak‟, 
http://www.sikurmemukad.com/sikurim/muslimworld/egypt2.html (accessed 12 June  2006). 
4 Middle East Media Research Institute (Memri), „Memri Special Dispatch No. 881: Growing 
Egyptian-U.S. Tensions: Egyptian Press Attacks President Bush‟, 
http://memri.org/bin/articles.cgi?Page=archives&Area=sd&ID=SP88105 (accessed 18 March 2005).   
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for September 2011, even though the state had banned him from engaging in political 
activity for five years after his release.
5
 In February 2010, Nour was officially 
nominated by his party‟s council as its candidate for president.6 
 Since his release, Nour has made significant efforts to strengthen his position, 
both within the Egyptian political arena and internationally. In early April 2009, he 
launched the “Cairo Declaration,” a document issued in cooperation with other 
Egyptian opposition leaders in which they called for democracy and political reforms 
in Egypt.
7
 Nour's campaign to draw public attention to the document included visits to 
most Egyptian governorates where he met with youth, non-governmental 
organizations, and ordinary Egyptians. Throughout this campaign, he tried to 
convince audiences to sign the “Cairo Declaration” and support the Tomorrow Party.8  
Likewise, Nour intensified his activity within the Egyptian opposition 
movement, voicing opposition to Gamal Mubarak‟s possible inheritance of Egypt's 
presidency from his father. Indeed, in October 2009, Nour became the driving force 
behind the establishment of a new oppositional group, the National Front Against the 
Succession.
9
 A few months later, in February 2010, Nour collaborated with former 
Director General of IAEA, Dr. Muhammad al-Baradaʿi, alongside other oppositional 
leaders, in establishing the National Association for Change, an umbrella organization 
calling for the promotion of “real democracy and social justice” in Egypt.10 Following 
a decision made by this organization, the Tomorrow Party boycotted both rounds of 
the elections for the People's Assembly of 2010, held on November 28
th
 and 
December 5
th
 respectively. Although the party won one seat, which was the same 
result as the elections of 2005, Nour refused to recognize its “fake” results, and 
expressed his support for the initiative to establish a shadow parliament, aiming to 
challenge the legitimacy of the newly elected one.
11
 It is worth noting that Nour's 
cooperation with other opposition forces is not restricted to his liberal counterparts, 
but also includes cooperation with the Muslim Brotherhood, Egypt's most powerful 
opposition group. Despite deep ideological differences, he has found it necessary to 
                                                           
5
Arian Fariborz and Mahmoud Tawfik, „Interview with Ayman Nour: I Won't Wait for the Regime to 
Give Me Its Blessings!‟, http://www.qantara.de/webcom/show_article.php/_c-476/_nr-1125/i.html, 
(accessed 20 March 2009; Joshua Muravchik, „The Trials of Ayman Nour‟,  
http://www.aei.org/docLib/20060602_20190.pdf (accessed October 2006). 
6 Los Angeles Times, „Egypt: First presidential Candidate Announced‟, 
http://latimesblogs.latimes.com/babylonbeyond/2010/02/egypt-first-presidential-candidate-
announced.html, (accessed 17 February 2010). 
7
 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „I„lan al-Qahirah‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?page_id=152, (accessed 6 
April 2009).   
8 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Ayman Nour Yadhhabu li-Tajamu„at al-Shabab li-Sharh al-Matalib 
al-„Asharah‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=173 (accessed 11 April 2009); Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman 
Nur, „Duktur Ayman Nour fi Ziyarah lil-Iskandariyyah‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=429 (accessed 4 
July 2009). 
9 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Ar-Rabi„ „Ashar min Uktubir Maw„id In„iqad al-Jabhah al-
Qawmiyyah did at-Tawrith‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=475 (accessed 5 October 2009). 
10 Al-Dustur, „Nur: Insihab al-Ghad min al-Jam„iyyah al-Wataniyyah lil-Taghyir Ghayr Warid‟, 
http://dostor.org/politics/egypt/10/april/14/13114?c=61877 (accessed 15 April 2010); Muhammad al-
Barada„i, „Ma„a Sanughayyir‟, http://www.taghyeer.net (n.d.).  
11 Imam Ahmad, „Hizb al-Ghad Yu„lin Muqata„atahu al-Intikhabat al-Barlamaniyyah al-Muqbilah‟, 
http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2010/september/14/elect_boycott.aspx, (accessed 14 
September 2010); Ayman Nur, „al-Ghad Yu‟ayyid Insihab al-Mu„aradah min Jawlat al-I„adah wa-La 
Ya„tarif bi-Barlaman al-Tazwir‟, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=471813452698 
(accessed 6 December 2010); Mira Tzoreff, „De-Democratizing Egyptian Elections‟, Tel-Aviv Notes, 
http://www.dayan.org/pdfim/Tzoreff%20egypt%20elect.pdf (accessed 20 December 2010). 
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maintain a tactical dialogue with the Islamist opposition around their common 
political goals.
12
 
On 14 April 2009, Nour made an international appearance when he spoke in 
front of the European Parliament in Brussels, calling upon its members to cease 
“supporting the tyranny” in Egypt.13 During his stay in Europe, he met with Edward 
McMillan-Scott, a British member of the European Parliament and one of its vice-
presidents, as well as with a number of Members of Parliament from Belgium and 
Italy.
14
 On 7 May 2009, Nour delivered a speech to the American Congress via video 
conference, in which he asked the United States for “help supporting the 
democratization process and social development in the Middle East.” He argued that 
his party's successful performance in the 2005 elections “provided practical and 
shocking evidence that a civilian liberal oppositional party may succeed at becoming 
a third player between an oppressive state and [Islamic] fundamentalism […] without 
compromising the principle and prioritization of stability.”15 At the end of 2009, the 
Egyptian authorities issued a travel ban against Nour and did not allow him to travel 
to The United States.
16
 The ban was lifted in October 2010 prior to his trip to a 
conference in Holland, following the intervention of the Dutch embassy.
17
 
Egyptian Liberals’ Approach to Israel  
The topic of liberalism in Egypt has gained considerable scholarly attention. Several 
books and articles have reviewed the state of liberalism in Egypt in different periods 
since the late 19
th
 century and onwards.
18
 Other studies have focused on the ideas and 
the particular circumstances of individuals within the liberal Egyptian circles.
19
 The 
specific attitudes of Egyptian liberals toward Israel have also been discussed in 
                                                           
12 Ayman Nour, „al-Ghad wal-Ikhwan bayan Sikkat al-Salamah wa-Sikkat al-Nadamah‟, 
http://www.dostor.org/authors/11/51/10/april/26/14492 (accessed 27 April 2010).   
13
 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Nour lil-Barlaman al-Urubi: Takhallu „an Da„m al-Istibdad‟,  
http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=199 (accessed 15 April 2009). 
14 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Ayman Nour Yujri Thalath Jirahat bil-„Ayn fi Biljika wa-Yusafir al-
Arba„a‟ li-Landan wa-Kanada‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=248 (accessed 25 April 2009). 
15 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Bayan Suhufi bi-Sha‟n Kalimat Duktur Ayman amam al-Kunjris‟, 
http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=282 (accessed  9May 2009). 
16 Al-Jazirah Nit, „Man„ Ayman Nour min al-Safr‟, http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/C7799385-
1A7D-4E32-B922-5F523A203179.htm (accessed 5 November 2009). 
17 Abir Sarras, „Egypt's Ayman Nour: We Will Win Even in Unfair Elections‟, 
http://www.rnw.nl/english/article/egypts-ayman-nour-we-will-win-even-unfair-elections (accessed 7 
November 2010). 
18 For instance: Albert Hourani, Arabic Thought in the Liberal Age 1798-1939 (London, New York, 
Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1962); Faruq Abu Zayd, al-Fikr al-Librali fi al-Sahafah al-
Misriyyah (Cairo: „Alam al-Kutub, 1997); Roel Meijer, The Quest for Modernity: Secular Liberal and 
Left-Wing Political Thought in Egypt, 1945-1958 (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002); Eberhard Kienle, 
A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt (London, New York: I.B. Tauris, 
2000); Raymond A. Hinnebusch, „The Reemergence of the Wafd Party: Glimpses of the Liberal 
Opposition in Egypt‟, International Journal of Middle East Studies, 16 (1984), pp. 99-121; Shimon 
Shamir, „Liberalism: From Monarchy to Postrevolution‟, in Egypt from Monarchy to Republic, ed. by 
Shimon Shamir (Boulder, San Francisco, Oxford: Westview Press, 1995), pp. 195-212. 
19 For example: Joshua Muravchik, The Next Founders: Voices of Democracy in the Middle East (New 
York, London: Encounter Books, 2009), pp. 153-200; David Govrin, „Hala Mustafa and the Liberal 
Arab Predicament‟, Middle East Quarterly, vol. XVII, no. 2 (Spring 2010), pp. 41-52; Meir Hatina, 
Identity Politics in the Middle East: Liberal Thought and Islamic Challenge in Egypt (London, New 
York: Tauris Academic Studies, 2007); Aaron Mannes, „Reformer in Egypt‟, Policy Review, 116 
(December 2002/January 2003), pp. 80-85.  
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several studies, particularly in the literature concerning the signing of the peace treaty 
between Egypt and Israel in March 1979, and the question of normalization of Israeli-
Egyptian relations.
20
 
Understanding the current state of liberalism in Egypt requires a brief historical 
overview. Liberalism was the unifying element of the constitutional monarchy period 
(1923-1952). This Egyptian “liberal age” (to borrow Albert Hourani's term) was 
characterized by lively intellectual discourse, as well as a multi-party political system 
which represented mainly the rural and the urban elites. Nevertheless, it worked to 
promote changes in all spheres of life, including the foundation of constitutional 
structure, legal reform, schooling and university systems and economic 
entrepreneurship. Amongst the most prominent liberals of that era were Muhammad 
Husayn Haykal, Ahmad Amin, ʿAbbas Mahmud al-ʿAqqad and Taha Husayn. Their 
thought was dominated by the principles of reason, rationalism, scientific spirit, 
separation of religion and politics, critical reexamination of the Islamic law and 
critical borrowing from the Western culture, and by dedication to the values of 
progress, freedom, pluralism, democracy and humanism. Since the 1930s, in the face 
of growing social tensions and the rise of competing Islamic and Arab Nationalist 
ideologies, Egyptian liberalism experienced a gradual process of decline both 
politically and ideologically. The Egyptian liberal age came to its end with the 
Revolution of 1952 and the dismantling of the ruling al-Wafd party.
21
 
Under Nasser, many liberals backed the revolution in the hope that it would 
provide for revival and modernity, although a minority among them engaged in rather 
feeble protests in the form of allegorical plays or limited demonstrations. In the early 
1970s, after almost two decades of relative absence from the Egyptian public arena, 
liberalism reemerged as a part of Anwar al-Sadat's de-Nasserization campaign. The 
remaining veterans of the old liberal age, such as Egypt's greatest writers, Tawfiq al-
Hakim and Nagib Mahfuz, were once again at center stage, leading the revival of the 
liberal trend. Since the 1980s, new generations of “neo-liberals” have grown, 
including Farag Foda, Husayn Ahmad Amin, Saʿid al-Naggar and others. Although 
the post-revolution liberals shared most principles and values with the pre-revolution 
generation, they operated in an entirely different social, cultural and political climate. 
In particular, they had to face the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and most 
importantly, unlike their predecessors, they constituted a small minority which was 
not a part of the ruling elite.
22
 
Under Sadat's rule, the proclamation of infitāḥ initiated the liberalization of the 
economic structure and reestablished a dynamic free-enterprise sector. These 
developments were accompanied by a small measure of political pluralism, which was 
manifested by the establishment of a limited and supervised party system. During 
Mubarak's era, there has been a substantial expansion of free speech, alongside 
greater permission for the registration of new political parties. Electoral politics have 
been conducted according to a “restricted party plurality” system that relies on a 
strong ruling party surrounded by small opposition groups.
 23
 However, the evolution 
of liberties in Egypt over these years has always been interrupted by heavy 
                                                           
20 For instance: Fouad Ajami, The Dream Palace of the Arabs (New York: Vintage Books, 1998), pp. 
253-312; Shimon Shamir, Mitsrayim Behanhagat Sadat (Tel-Aviv: Dvir, 1978), pp. 181-246; David 
Sultan, Between Cairo and Jerusalem: The Normalization between Arab states and Israel (Tel-
Aviv: The University Institute for Diplomacy and Regional Cooperation, Tel-Aviv University, 2007).  
21
 See Shamir, „Liberalism: From Monarchy to Postrevolution‟.  
22 Ibid. 
23 Tzoreff, „De-Democratizing Egyptian Elections‟. 
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authoritarian restrictions; that is to say, trials of civilians by military courts, growing 
numbers of political prisoners, attempts to muzzle the press, limitations on institutions 
of civil society and widespread official interference in the elections.
24
 A recent 
example of such de-liberalization steps taken by the authorities was provided in the 
2010 elections for the People's Assembly, in which the ruling National Democratic 
Party (NDP) and affiliated independents won 93% of the seats, while a heavy-handed 
strategy was implemented to defeat opposition candidates.
25
 
In contemporary Arab debates liberals are usually defined broadly as “scholars 
and activists whose main concern is the introduction of Western-type democracy in 
Arab countries.”26 The Tomorrow Party, which defines its line as “socialist liberal 
democratic,”27 has indeed made the liberalization of the Egyptian regime through free 
and fair elections its main political message and leading demand.
28
 The party's 
political platform defines “liberal democracy” as a “peaceful format for managing 
disagreements and conflicts in accordance with principles which are accepted by all 
parties [involved].” It sets the target of “struggling for […] the creation of democratic 
society based on the participation of all nationalities, groups and classes in 
determining the fate of their homeland”.29 In September 2009, during a visit to the 
Suez Governorate, Nour elaborated that “liberalism means the acceptance of the 
other, religious tolerance and citizenship rights.”30 As regards economic policy, the 
party's platform calls for “economic liberalism based on the freedom of possession, 
fair competition and encouragement of innovation and creativity, while setting 
[appropriate] regulations.”31 
During the monarchy period, Egyptian liberals were hardly troubled with the 
appearance of the Zionist movement. Ahmad Lutfi al-Sayyid, for instance, attended in 
1925 the opening ceremony of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem as an official 
representative of the Egyptian government, despite criticism by Palestinian Arabs.
 32  
Al-Sayyid and many other liberals sought to establish the Nile Valley as the sole basis 
of modern Egyptian national identity. As such, they did not feel so committed to the 
relatively distant Arab-Jewish conflict in Mandatory Palestine, but were rather 
indifferent about it.
33
 This type of liberal discourse was still evident even on the eve 
of the Egyptian invasion of Israel on 15 May 1948; in a closed session held by the 
Egyptian parliament's upper house, the former Egyptian prime minister, Ismaʿil Sidqi 
Pasha, called on his country in vain to avoid war, saying that Egypt does not have “a 
major share in the Palestine conflict” and its “supreme interest lies in the 
establishment of stable peace.”34 Accordingly, it is no wonder that during the 1970s, 
                                                           
24
 Kienle, A Grand Delusion: Democracy and Economic Reform in Egypt, pp. 1-16.   
25 Tzoreff, „De-Democratizing Egyptian Elections‟. 
26  Uriya Shavit, „Is Shura a Muslim Form of Democracy? Roots and Systemization of a Polemic‟, 
Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 46, No. 3(May 2010), p. 362.   
27 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad (n.d.), p. 14.  
28  Ibid, p. 16; Uriya Shavit, The Wars of Democracy (Tel-Aviv: Tel-Aviv University, 2008, in 
Hebrew), p. 270. 
29
 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad, p. 47.  
30 Mawqi„ al-Duktur Ayman Nur, „Ziyarat d. Ayman Nour lil-Suways wa-Ijtima„uh bil-Qiwa al-
Siyasiyyah bil-Muhafazah‟,  http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=466 (accessed 13 September 2009). 
31 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad, p. 31.  
32 Haggai Erlich, Students and University in 20th Century Egyptian Politics (London: Frank Cass, 
1989), pp. 63, 88.  
33 For more see: I. Gershoni, Egypt between Distinctiveness and Unity: The Search for National 
Identity 1919-1948 (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, 1980, in Hebrew), p. 305. 
34 Itamar Rabinovich, „Egypt and the Palestine Question Before and After the Revolution‟, in Egypt 
from Monarchy to Republic, ed. by Shamir, pp. 327-8. 
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some liberals, such as Mahfuz and al-Hakim, were amongst the most devoted 
advocates of a separate peace with Israel, urging their country to favor its own 
particular interests over Arab ones. At the same time, liberals who were considered 
proponents of the Pan-Arab ideology, such as Yusuf Idris and al-Sayyid Yasin, were 
far more reluctant to accept a partial settlement of the conflict.
35
 
The positions of liberals toward Israel in contemporary Egypt are varied. Some 
of them see peace with Israel as an essential component of Egypt‟s transition from 
what they perceive as a reality of backwardness and oppression towards a future of 
progressiveness and freedom. Peace with Israel, in their view, is a precondition for the 
promotion of political, economical and cultural liberalism in their country. Moreover, 
they tend to portray Israel as sort of a “role model” for democracy, pluralism and 
freedom in the region.
36
 While the vast majority of these liberals call for an Israeli 
withdrawal from Arab territories occupied in 1967, many of them support a “warm 
peace” with Israel, including normalization in different fields, such as economic 
cooperation, intensive people-to-people interactions, tourism and cultural exchange.
37
 
This group includes, among others, Tariq Heggy, Amin Al-Mahdi, ʿAli Salem, Saʿd 
al-Din Ibrahim, and Muhammad Saʿid al-ʿAshmawi. Heggy, for instance, has 
published an article encouraging the Egyptian media to promote what he called “the 
culture of peace” with Israel. “A war culture,” he argued, “[…] will divert our 
energies from what should be our main target at this juncture: building up a strong 
society capable of facing external challenges effectively by using the same tools as 
those used by advanced, successful societies, not those of a Bedouin mentality used 
by people addicted to failure.”38 
On the other hand, contemporary liberalism in Egypt is not always accompanied 
by pacifist attitudes toward Israel. There are many Egyptian liberals who do not 
consider peace with Israel an integral part of their agenda, and strongly object to any 
form of normalization with Israel. Objection to normalization usually belongs to one 
of two categories – conditional or categorical: some insist that normal relations with 
Israel must be avoided so long as Israel occupies Arab territory, while others deeply 
believe that Israel is imperialist by its very nature, and warn against the dangers of an 
Israeli cultural invasion and its expansionist ambitions. Many liberals who belong to 
the latter group have Islamist orientations,
39
 as is the case with Gamal al-Bana and 
Hasan Hanafi,
40
 or Arab nationalist tendencies, as in the case of ʿAbd al-Halim Qindil 
                                                           
35
 For more about the debate on Egypt's Arab identity, see: Sa„d al-Din Ibrahim (ed.), ‘Urubat Misr: 
Hiwar al-Sab‘inat (Cairo: Markaz al-Dirasat al-Siyasiyyah wal-Istiratijiyyah bil-Ahram, 1978); Fouad 
Ajami , The Arab Predicament: Arab Political Thought and Practice Since 1967 (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1993), pp. 124-138. 
36
 Shimon Shamir, „Hayesh „Atid liMgamot haNeorut ba„Olam ha„Aravi‟, Alpayyim 31 (2007), pp.156-
7; Shimon Shamir, preface in: Amin Al-Mahdi, Hadeah Haaheret (Tel-Aviv: Hakibutz Hameuchad, in 
Hebrew, 2001), pp. IX-XVIII. 
37  For the definition of "warm" and "cold" peace see: Benjamin Miller, „The Global Sources of 
Regional Transitions from War to Peace: The Case of the Middle East‟, Davis Occasional Papers, No. 
75 (October 1999), p. 4-6.  
38 Tarek Heggy, Culture, Civilization and Humanity (London: Frank Cass Publishers, 2003), pp. 65-68.  
39 It should be noted in this context that The Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt see Israel as illegitimate 
Jewish state in Islamic territory and oppose the peace treaty with Israel for religious and political 
reasons. See for example: „Abd al-Fattah Muhammad al-„Awaisi, Tasawwur al-Ikhwan lil-Qadiyyah 
al-Falastiniyyah (Cairo: Dar al-Tawzi„ wal-Nashr al-Islamiyyah, 1989). 
40 See for instance: A. Dankowitz, and Y. Feldner, „Sheikh Gamal Al-Bana: Social and Religious 
Moderation Vs. Political Extremism‟, http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/0/1827.htm (accessed 
16 March 2007); Hasan Hanafi, „al-Tatbi„ Jahra‟, http://www.alittihad.ae/wajhatdetails.php?id=9555 
(accessed 29 January 2005). 
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and George Ishaq.
41
 Qindil is one of the founders of Enough Movement (Harakat 
Kifaya), also known as the Egyptian Movement for Change, a group that promotes 
democracy and reforms. Qindil has suggested conducting a referendum on the 
“freezing or cancellation of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty” as a necessary step in 
order to liberate Egypt from “the dictations of American-Israeli colonialism.”42 
Egyptian liberals also disagree about the relationship between democratization 
and the peace with Israel. While democratic peace theories argue that liberally 
constituted states tend to be more peaceful in their dealings with other countries,
43
 
some Egyptian liberals, such as Qindil, see future democracy in their country as a 
means of liberation from the “chains” of the Camp David Accords.44 Other liberals, 
on the other hand, see democracy not just as a guarantee for the absence of war with 
Israel, but also as a prerequisite for the creation of a warmer peace in the future. Amin 
al-Mahdi, for example, distinguishes between the desired “democratic peace” and the 
current “cold peace” with Israel: “True peace can only be democratic, whereas a 
peace that was made with no [democratic] choice is not a true one. It can [only] be a 
peace of surrender, an imposed peace, an official peace and so forth.”45  
Nour and the Peace Treaty with Israel 
On 1 November 2009, Nour published an unusual letter in the Wall Street Journal, in 
which he responded to an article which accused him of being anti-Semitic. This article 
quoted Nour's speech at a conference in the city of Port Said, emphasizing “the value 
of standing up to this enemy [i.e. Israel], behind which lies all evils, conspiracies and 
threats that are spawned against Egypt.”46 In his response letter, Nour rejected the 
accusation and tried to explain his words:  
[…] Anyone examining my record can easily discern that I have always supported and 
upheld Egypt's peace treaty with Israel, and have strongly opposed calls of aggression 
against Israel. I have also consistently called for a peaceful and just resolution to the 
Arab Israeli conflict. […] I would like to conclude that the "anti-Semitic" label is one 
that I strongly reject. My critiques pertain to the conduct of the state of Israel in certain 
contexts and not to the Jewish people as a whole. The history of Egypt is replete with 
contributions from Jewish Egyptians, and that history of pluralism that once defined 
Egypt is one that I recall fondly and deeply respect. Principles of religious pluralism 
and mutual respect and tolerance are principles that I strongly advocate not just in my 
position as a political activist, but as a human being.
47
 
                                                           
41 For instance: Mashahed, „Bayan li-Harakat Kifayah bi-Sha‟n Hudur Munassiquha li-Mu„tamar bi-
Turkiya‟, http://mashahed.blogspot.com/2006/06/blog-post_115110512645472020.html (accessed 24 
June 2006); Muhammad Hamidah, „Muthaqifun: Qarar Husni Mughazalah 'Sakhifah' li-Isra‟il min ajl 
al-Yunasku‟, http://www.elaph.com/Web/Culture/2009/6/450717.htm (accessed 13 June 2009). 
42 „Abd al-Halim Qindil, „Khuttah li-Kifayah Thaniyyah‟, http://www.harakamasria.org/node/9764 
(accessed 20 September 2007). 
43 See for example: Ronald Paris, At War's End: Building Peace after Civil Conflict (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 6.  
44 „Abd al-Halim Qindil, Kart Ahmar lil-Ra’is (Cairo: Dar al-Thaqafah al-Jadidah, 2009), p. 100, 248.  
45 Al-Mahdi, Hadeah Haaheret, p. 117.  
46 Amr Bargisi and Samuel Tadros, „Why Are Egypt's 'Liberals' Anti-Semitic?‟, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704335904574497143564035718.html (accessed 28 
October 2009).   
47 Ayman Nour, „I Reject Anti-Semitism and Respect Egypt's Pluralism‟, 
http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703792304574503831810437644.html (accessed 1 
November 2009).  
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Systematic study of Nour's speeches on Israel in various contexts over the past 
decade reveals a multifaceted picture. On the one hand, Nour speaks of Israel as an 
enemy of Egypt and the Arab world. He has adopted a hostile tone against it, and 
expressed his support for Palestinian and Lebanese acts of violence. In addition, he 
refuses to meet with Israelis and strongly objects to any kind of cultural or economic 
normalization with Israel. On the other hand, Nour does not call for the annulment of 
the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty, and is not interested in resuming warfare against 
Israel, but rather accepts the existence of Israel alongside Palestine in the 1967 
borders. Likewise, his objection to normalization with Israel is conditional, not 
categorical, and may possibly be lifted in the future, as political circumstances 
change. 
Nour's conflicting positions toward Israel in the Wall Street Journal may be 
partly attributed to the different audiences he addressed, namely Egyptian public 
opinion in the first case, and American public opinion in the other. However, 
considering the fact that similar duality is evident also in other of Nour's speeches, as 
well as in official statements of the Tomorrow Party, further explanation is required. 
As I shall argue, understanding Nour's motives allows us to interpret his position 
toward Israel on three different levels: First, these statements obviously reflected 
something authentic and genuine in his point of view. Second, his position toward 
Israel was sometimes a part of a broader line against the Egyptian regime, and did not 
necessarily represent a systematic doctrine; it reflected a tactical position rather than 
an ideological one. Third, another factor most likely motivated Nour to adopt a hostile 
tone against Israel was the popular appeal of this position. Presumably, by utilizing 
the strong anti-Israel sentiment in Egypt, he attempted to expand his political base as 
well as promote his broader liberal messages among wider audiences in Egyptian 
society.
48
 
The Tomorrow Party's political platform (which is based on a book written by 
Nour in 2002) highlights the value of peace. It opens with a statement on its belief in 
“peace, friendship and interaction with all peoples of the world”;49 likewise, without 
explicit mention of the name of Israel, the foreign policy section in the platform 
begins by emphasizing the “principle of resolving disputes between countries in 
peaceful ways.”50 In the section describing its principles, the party declares that 
“Peace based on justice will enable the peoples of the region and the world to achieve 
comprehensive development, prosperity and welfare, and will enable Egypt to 
actively participate in the formation of the global culture and the world order, by 
dialogue and cooperation with other civilizations and countries.”51  
Despite the aforementioned peaceful rhetoric, the rest of the platform raises 
doubts whether these principles apply to Israel. Its general foreign policy section calls 
upon Arab countries to reunite “against the Zionist enemy.”52 Regarding the situation 
in the Middle East, and, more precisely, the second Intifada, the platform criticizes the 
“official Arab stance” that relies on “condemnation and censure, without [the use of] 
effective mechanisms, in order to stop Arab bloodshed on the Palestinian lands.”53 
                                                           
48 
An Egyptian government poll in 2006 found that 92 percent of Egyptians consider Israel an enemy: 
AFP, „Egypt Poll: Israel, Denmark, US – Enemies‟, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-
3322428,00.html (accessed 1 November 2006). 
49 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad, p. 14. 
50 Ibid, p. 211.  
51 Ibid, p. 19. 
52 Ibid, p. 212.  
53
 Ibid, p. 29.  
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Furthermore, the platform supports the use of different forms of force against Israel, 
including “martyr operations”, namely suicide attacks, in the Palestinian and the 
Lebanese contexts:  
The Second Intifada, and the success of the Lebanese resistance [i.e. Hezbollah] in 
forcing Israel to evacuate [its army] from south Lebanon, are giving hope to all forces 
of justice and peace in the Arab region […] Israeli soldiers and settlers were subjected 
to approximately 5,000 firearms attacks and 250 grenades throwing since the beginning 
of the Intifada. Not to mention the recent martyr operations, which not only put an end 
to the [Israeli] arrogance, but also raised doubts whether the [Israeli] use of force and 
violence against the Palestinians is the shortest way to end the intifada and achieve 
security.
54
  
Beyond its belligerent tone, the Tomorrow Party's official statements also fuel 
hostility against Israel and what they describe as Israeli government actions. The 
party's political platform refers to Israel as “the Zionist enemy.”55 Moreover, former 
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon is described as implementing a “Nazi policy 
which was manifested in [the] oppression, killing and murder” of Palestinians during 
the Second Intifada.
56
 Similarly, in response to the Gaza War (Operation Cast Lead) 
in December 2008, the party accused Israel of committing a “racist immoral Zionist 
crime.” Nour himself blamed Israel in one of his articles for committing an 
“inhumane massacre.”57 Somewhat oddly, the platform even calls upon Egypt to fight 
against the alleged Israeli conspiracies “to incite the African countries to attack on 
Egypt's profits and its historical right to the Nile water.”58 
Nour is also known as a critic of normalization with Israel, which constitutes – 
de jure, at least – an integral part of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty. In a recent 
article, Nour stressed that his objection to normalization may be lifted only by “Israeli 
withdrawal from the occupied territories and a fair final solution for the Palestinian 
problem and for Jerusalem.” He explained, “indeed, we have an official peace treaty 
[with Israel], but sentiments are not controlled by treaties nor by the authority of the 
government.”59 As a parliament member, Nour founded the Egyptian parliamentary 
committee to promote the boycott of Israeli goods.
60
 Likewise, he blatantly refuses to 
meet with Israelis.
61
 His deep commitment to the Egyptian anti-normalization 
movement was again revealed in July 2009 after his release from prison. After a four 
year hiatus, he resumed his “Wednesday Meetings,” a weekly conference held at the 
Nour Culture Center in Cairo. Symbolically, the first such meeting was dedicated to 
what was defined as the “crime” of exporting Egyptian natural gas to Israel at a cheap 
price. Although Nour explained his objection to the Israeli-Egyptian gas export 
                                                           
54 Ibid, p. 28.  
55 Ibid, p. 212. 
56 Ibid, p. 28.  
57 Hizb al-Ghad, „Bayan Hizb al-Ghad bi-Khusus Ahdath Ghazzah‟,  
http://news.elghad.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=345&Itemid=29 
(accessed 30 December 2008); Ayman Nour, „Fashl wa-Laysa Ta‟ammura‟,  
http://news.elghad.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=360&Itemid=5 (n.d.). 
58 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad, p. 266. 
59Ayman Nour, „Ta‟dib Faruq Husni wa-Ikhtiyar Ubama‟,  
http://news.elghad.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=356&Itemid=5 (n.d.). 
60 Himam Sarhan, „Min Huwa Ayman Nur?‟,  
http://www.swissinfo.ch/ara/front.html?siteSect=105&sid=5674336&cKey=1236067777000&ty=st&rs
=yes (accessed 11 April 2005). 
61
 Gateway Pundit, „Rice Pushes Egypt towards Democracy‟, 
http://gatewaypundit.blogspot.com/2005/06/rice-pushes-egypt-towards-democracy.html (accessed 20 
June 2005). 
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agreement primarily on the grounds of economic considerations, his emotional 
resistance to normalization may also played an important role.
62
   
At times, Nour's anti-Israeli attitudes should not be taken at face value; such 
rhetoric was a way for him to criticize the Egyptian regime. For example, during the 
aforementioned “Wednesday Meeting” concerning the export of gas to Israel, Nour 
proposed the compilation of a blacklist of names that “will be chased by the shame of 
wasting Egypt's resources.” This list included former President Mubarak, his son 
Gamal and other high-ranking officials.
63
 Likewise, in response to the Gaza War, the 
Tomorrow Party released a statement that “the party condemns the despicable Zionist 
offensive against the brother Palestinian people, and condemns with the same 
harshness the helplessness and the absence of strategic vision, which has became 
synonymous with Egyptian foreign policy during the last years.”64 Following the 
events of the Gaza flotilla raid on 31 May 2010, Nour condemned the “Israeli 
bullying of civilians.” Concomitantly, he called for protest marches against the “Arab 
silence” which, in his opinion, “reached the level of a shameful conspiracy”.65 The 
frequent use of anti-Israeli rhetoric as leverage against the authoritarian regime was 
repeated by Nour in other speeches. For instance, in an article commemorating the 
41
st
 anniversary of the 1967 war, he blamed the Arab defeat on the dictatorial Arab 
regimes: 
How can someone who is defeated from within win?! How can he fight when he is 
hand-cuffed, oppressed by all the [security] apparatuses, worthless and lacking an 
opinion?! How can he win when he is denied the minimum right to choose who will 
rule [his country] and who will represent him?! […] Despite this, we decided not to 
learn the lesson and not to face the origin of the disease. […] After 'some' of the Arab 
territory had returned, isn't it our right to ask when we will get back 'some' of our 
democratic rights?
66 
Anti-Israel, Ambivalence toward America 
In contrast to many Egyptian liberals with nationalistic tendencies, Nour distinguishes 
between his approach to Israel and his approach to the United States. This distinction 
was made explicit in June 2005, when the High Council of the Tomorrow Party 
discussed whether to approve a meeting between Nour and American Secretary of 
State, Condoleeza Rice, during her upcoming visit to Cairo. The party spokeswoman 
and Nour's wife, Gamila Ismaʿil, announced that “it has been decided that the 
Tomorrow Party will accept to enter into a dialogue or exchange ideas with any 
                                                           
62
 During his speech, Nour boasted that as early as 15 January 2000 he had requested in Parliament a 
clarification from Egyptian Petroleum Minister, Samih Fahmi, as to how exporting gas to Israel is in 
accordance with Egyptian “sentiments and causes”. See: Ahmad Ghanim, „Mu„tamar La li-Tasdir al-
Ghaz li-Isra‟il‟, http://aymannoor.net/ar/?p=450 (accessed 12 July 2009). 
63 Ibid. 
64 Hizb al-Ghad, „Bayan Hizb al-Ghad bi-Khusus Ahdath Ghazzah‟.  
65 Ayman Nour, „Bayan Suhufi‟, http://www.facebook.com/note.php?note_id=398803267698 
(accessed 31 May 2010); In the same vein, the General Committee Chairman of The Tomorrow Party 
in Beheira Governorate, Ahmed Melad, praised countries who expressed their protest against the events 
of the Gaza flotilla raid, while criticizing Egypt's lack of response. Ahmed Melad, „Ustul al-Huriyyah 
wa-Mastul Abu Hums‟, 
http://news.elghad.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=438&Itemid=99999999 
(accessed 1 June 2010). 
66 Ayman Nour, „„Am Ba„d 40 „Ama‟, 
http://news.elghad.org/news/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=124&Itemid=29 (n.d.). 
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person from within Egypt or from outside of Egypt, whether a governmental official 
or not, except for people from, or representing, Israel.” She concluded, “As such, we 
welcome discussions with any American or non-American official.”67  
The party's hesitation before the meeting with Secretary Rice illustrated Nour's 
ambivalent position toward the United States during the Bush administration years. 
On one hand, Nour's run for the presidency in 2005 was partly inspired by President 
Bush's call for democracy in Egypt. On the other hand, Nour strongly opposed the 
American invasion of Iraq in 2003,
68
 and spoke against “the American hegemony in 
the region” and its “pro-Israel bias.”69 Furthermore, Secretary Rice's public support 
following his arrest contributed to the regime‟s portrayal of Nour as an American 
collaborator; he was labeled with insulting nicknames such as “Condoleezza's friend” 
or her “common law husband.”70 Hence, despite Secretary Rice‟s important role in 
obtaining his release, Nour felt embarrassed by her involvement in his case and 
renounced her support. “I did not ask anyone to defend me,” he stressed. “I am in 
favor of international empathy, but against international intervention.”71 In the same 
vein, he was reluctant to meet with her, presumably out of fear that such a meeting 
might cost him votes in the September 2005 election. Yet during his subsequent 
imprisonment, Nour was apparently once again looking for American aid, despite its 
undesirable potential side effects. Furthermore, he was disappointed at President 
Bush‟s lack of commitment to his freedom agenda. “I can‟t say that the American 
administration has always been serious in pushing for my release,” he said at that 
time. “Sometimes it gave priority to principles, but more often interests prevailed.”72  
The discrepancy between Nour's approaches to the United States and to Israel 
grew wider after Barack Obama entered the White House in January 2009. Nour 
responded enthusiastically to Obama‟s election, and suggested that pressure from the 
new American administration played a role in his release.
73
 During his May 2009 
speech to Congress, Nour expressed his “high expectations” of President Obama.74 
Even before the American elections, when Obama was still only a presidential 
candidate, Nour sent him a warm open letter from his prison, ending as follows:  
Senator Obama, We await much from you as a Democratic candidate and president 
expected to lead the whole world towards a real and fair change. Your generation and 
all the powers of reform, democrats and liberals in Egypt and the Arab world, hope that 
January 20 [2009] becomes a day of freedom and democracy not only in the United 
States of America but in the whole world, primarily by rectifying the wrongs caused by 
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 Gateway Pundit, „Rice Pushes Egypt towards Democracy‟. 
68 Ayman Nour, „Ayman Nour Biography‟. 
69 Hizb al-Ghad, Barnamij Hizb al-Ghad, pp. 28-29, 212.  
70
 Shabakat al-Nab‟ al-Ma„lumatiyyah, „Thawrat al-Nil al-Zarqa‟: Misr „Ala Safih Sakhin‟, 
http://www.annabaa.org/nbanews/45/354.htm (accessed 7 April 2005). 
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European role in his release, see: Democracy Now, „Enduring Jailings and Attacks, Dissident Ayman 
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72 Nadia Abou el Magd, „Dissident fights on from prison‟, 
http://www.thenational.ae/article/20080727/FOREIGN/454868021/1040/ART (accessed 27 July 2008). 
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long years of supporting dictators under the pretext of protecting interests at the 
account of principles. Please accept my sincere wishes for your success.
75
  
Yet, even after President Obama took office, Nour has been careful not to be overly 
identified with the United States. In May 2009, he refused an invitation to visit 
Washington, including both a private lunch with President Obama and an appearance 
before the American Congress. Instead, he limited himself to a live video conference 
speech from Cairo, in which he called for an expansion of American foreign aid to 
Egypt, while restraining his criticism against the Mubarak regime. He was determined 
not to fall into another trap that would enable the Egyptian regime to portray him as a 
traitor serving American interests. On the contrary, in an interview with the Egyptian 
daily al-Masri al-Yawm, he stressed that his speech to the Congress meant “to explain 
[the Egyptian] point of view to the world”.76 
Obama's Cairo speech on 4 June 2009 provided another example of the basic 
ambivalence underlying Nour's position concerning the United States and its desired 
role in the region. A few days before the speech, he urged President Obama to try to 
balance “between amicable relations with existing regimes ruling Muslim countries 
and long-term friendship with the people who regard these regimes as oppressive and 
corrupt,” and “between regional stability and demands for reform and democracy.”77 
After hearing the speech, however, Nour did not hide his disappointment, saying that 
“what touched on democracy and human rights in the speech was far less than what 
we wanted.”78 
To conclude, while taking a hostile stance toward Israel, Nour sees the United 
States as a potential partner in promoting democratization in Egypt; at the same time, 
he does not fully trust its intentions and strives to keep a safe distance from its 
patronage. 
Nour's Vision for the Future  
In light of Nour's hostile stance toward Israel, it is interesting to investigate how he 
envisions the future of relations between Egypt and Israel. Does he support the 
continuation of the peace treaty, or perhaps a return to a state of war? This question 
became more urgent in light of the Gaza War during the winter of 2008–2009, as 
Nour wrote in one of his articles: “There is a question that doesn't stop bothering me, 
what should we do?! Will we protest, condemn, burn cloths with drawings of the Star 
of David, threaten, be silent, drown in shame, spit in the faces of our regimes?! […] Is 
there a reasonable Egyptian with good intentions who expects Mubarak to declare war 
on Israel?!” Nour's answer was very decisive: “I believe that „no‟ is the only answer 
to all the aforementioned questions.” After rejecting all these militant reactions to the 
Gaza War, Nour offered his own solution. As usual, he quickly diverted all his arrows 
from Israel toward the Egyptian regime, criticizing it for “failing” to use its influence 
                                                           
75 The quotation is presented in the original English as posted on: Ayman Nour, „Nour's Letter to 
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in order to prevent “Hamas's mistakes” and “Israeli aggression. […] The only 
solution,” Nour stressed, “is to change the hands that took care of this issue, starting 
with [Egyptian foreign minister, Ahmad] Abu Al-Gheit.” “The most trivial response 
to this failure,” he continued, “is a consistent opening of the Rafah border crossing 
and a declaration by President [Mubarak] that he is committed to the verdict of the 
gas exporting trial [which stated the freeze of natural gas export to Israel].”79 
Nour, therefore, is encouraging neither a return to a state of war with Israel, nor 
a reversal of the Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty.
80
 Nevertheless, as an Egyptian leader, 
Nour has been attempting to put forth an alternative to the official Egyptian approach 
regarding the nature of relations with Israel. In one article, for instance, he hints that 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan is the public figure he most admires, 
for his policy on Israel as well as on other foreign and domestic affairs. While this 
article was seemingly written for the sake of glorifying Erdoğan's anti-Israeli position 
during the Gaza War, Nour peppered it with references to the many similarities 
between Erdoğan's biography and his own.81 First, Erdoğan is young, 55, and quite 
unlike politicians of the „older generation‟‟ Second, Erdoğan was imprisoned in 1998 
because of „the fear from his increasing popularity and public influence pushed the 
Turkish state to fabricate a ridiculous prosecution against him‟. Third, in 2007 he 
formed a new party „in order to fight against poverty, hunger and corruption, and to 
change the social and the political reality in Turkey.‟82 
Nour appears to have used his article to co-opt Erdoğan's increasing popularity 
following the Gaza War, due to his anti-Israeli positions, in order to legitimize and 
promote a much broader message. At the end of his article, Nour praised Erdoğan's 
domestic and foreign achievements in Turkey, hinting at his own desire to implement 
a similar vision in Egypt: 
Within a very few years, Erdoğan succeeded in creating a new Turkey, while making 
the dreams of his people come true and strengthening the domestic political and 
economical abilities of his homeland. Then, after his genuine domestic achievements, 
Erdoğan had to rehabilitate the Turkish role in the foreign arena, by strengthening its 
eligibility for European Union membership and playing important roles in the Middle 
East and in the Islamic [world]. That was the real beginning of Erdoğan's role in the 
Gaza crisis, which gained – as most of his positions – the overwhelming support of the 
people in Turkey.
83
 
Another political figure deeply appreciated by Nour is the Palestinian leader and 
Fatah senior official, Marwan al-Barghouti, who has been imprisoned in Israel since 
2002 on charges of ordering the murder of Israeli civilians and attacks on Israeli 
soldiers. Nour believes that Egypt must help the Palestinians find a successor to 
President Mahmoud ʿAbbas, whom he sees as “outdated.” This successor, he claims, 
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should be “a middle of the road person, who is not from Hamas, but at the same time, 
accepted by it. […] Marwan al-Barghouti,” he assumes, “is the best one to lead the 
Palestinians through this era, because he is a symbol of struggling and is also a young 
charismatic man, who is accepted by all [Palestinian] parties.”84 Nour's preference of 
al-Barghouti over ʿAbbas does not necessarily indicate his objection to the moderate, 
compromising line that ʿAbbas represents, but rather his belief that achieving peace 
requires an attractive successor to ʿAbbas, one who is capable of competing with 
Hamas's popularity. In fact, Nour attributes great importance to the resolution of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, which he believes has “consumed the blood and capacities 
of the people and opened the door to fundamentalism, terrorism and oppression” in 
order to weaken radical Islamic forces like Hamas.
85
 According to his open letter to 
Obama, as well as to the Tomorrow Party political platform, Nour accepts the two 
state solution; in other words, the establishment of a Palestinian state alongside Israel, 
according to the borders of 1967. In this respect, Nour‟s view is in accordance with 
the mainstream international position, including United Nations resolution 242 and 
the principle of “land for peace.”86 
Conclusion 
This article has analyzed Ayman Nour's position toward Israel based on his articles, 
speeches and interviews, as well as official statements of his party. Although Israel is 
not at the focus of Nour's political discourse, he has mentioned Israel in a variety of 
contexts, including the Second Intifada, Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon, Egypt‟s 
export of natural gas to Israel, the Gaza War and the Gaza flotilla raid.  
Nour capitalized upon each of these to promote his line against the Egyptian 
regime. He has repeatedly criticized what he views as the regime's helplessness in the 
face of Israeli military operations and, moreover, its readiness to foster cooperation 
and normal relations with Israel. This kind of criticism was intended to portray 
Mubarak's regime as weak, subordinate and betraying Arab national interests by 
obeying the dictates of Israel and the United States. At the same time, this line also 
enabled Nour and his party to emerge as an honorable, patriotic alternative. 
The recent events of the 2011 Egyptian Revolution have made the scenario of a 
liberal candidate coming to power much more realistic. While Nour did not initiate 
the demonstrations of 25 January, he played an active role by leading his supporters in 
the streets of Cairo and urging Mubarak to depart from his office.
87
 Although the 
revolution was fueled by domestic demands, the future relations with Israel were on 
the agenda of most Egyptian political actors. Some liberal activists, such as the 
blogger, Maikel Nabil Sanad, saw the democratization of their country as a "chance to 
end cold peace between the two states [i.e., Egypt and Israel] and to begin a new era 
of real peace."
88
The Egyptian Armed Forces, which took over the government during 
the transition period, announced that Egypt will remain "committed to the treaties and 
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agreements to which it is a party", implicitly referring to the peace treaty with Israel.
89
 
Nour, for his part, called for a referendum to amend the Camp David Accords: 
Some people believe that this agreement is a thing of the past, and that it must be 
developed in a correct manner. They believe that some of the terms are humiliating to 
the Egyptian side. I belong to this group of people. Other people believe that the Camp 
David accords give Egypt certain guarantees on the ground, and that these must not be 
jeopardized at present. I don't maintain this position, but at the end of the day, my 
opinion is not the only one that counts. We should hold a referendum.
90
 
The case of Ayman Nour indicates that the democratization of Egypt may 
undermine the stability of the Israeli-Egyptian peace; the threat may come not only 
from the rise of political Islam in the form of the Muslim Brotherhood, but also from 
some of the liberal forces with aspirations to power. Indeed, Nour's populist use of 
anti-Israel rhetoric indicates that if a liberal leader of his kind comes to power, we 
may very well see the “cold peace” between Egypt and Israel turn even colder. 
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